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Replacing the Patient: The Fiction of Prosthetics in Medical Practice 
 
Laura L. Behling 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
The invention of computer simulations used for practicing surgical maneuvers in 
a video game-like format has an ancestry in the artificial limbs of history and is 
reflected, grotesquely, in Edgar Allan Poe's short story, "The Man That Was Used 
Up " (J850). The nineteenth century worked to ensure that the incomplete body did 
indeed retain a sense of self by creating prostheses to mimic corporeal wholeness. 
Our present-day technology seems intent on doing precisely the opposite, deliberately 
fragmenting the body and challenging our understanding of the body and 
the prosthetic. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Painted on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel is the famous image of God, the 
Creator, reaching out to touch the newly-formed Adam, finger to finger. This divine 
connection, the image suggests, gave life to an inanimate being. That God (or 
at least Michelangelo's vision of God) reached out to connect physically with his 
human creation, to touch Adam, is for many evidence of divinity in humanity. Yet 
importantly, the two fingers never touch in the painting; the implied connection is 
made explicit by us, the admiring observers. Read in a contemporary medical context, 
this image suggests the practice of haptics, the science of technological touch 
and manipulation that is now rapidly extending its reach throughout medicine. 
And, like Michelangelo's picture of God and Adam, haptic practice relies on a 
belief in an anatomical connection that does not, in fact, occur. Physicians and surgeons 
who previously touched real bodies with their own flesh-and-blood hands are 
turning increasingly to computer simulations, to virtual realities, in order to learn 
procedures and techniques, thus animating—in a way that suggests Shelley's Dr. 
Frankenstein rather than Michelangelo's God—a lifeless jumble of latex and wires. 
 
 
 
 
 
Human bodies, of course, have long been made up of materials other than 
flesh, blood and bone. Both in the United States and elsewhere, these hybridized 
bodies-part human, part technology-were formed using artificial prostheses fash­
ioned to create the semblance of a symmetrical body. Literary texts such as Edgar 
Allan Poe's mid-nineteenth century short story, "The Man That Was Used Up," 
portray characters who are composed of technologically-fashioned parts and, con­
sequently, challenge the reader to consider the relationship between anatomical 
wholeness and human integrity, individual corporeal parts and the sum of those 
parts. 
This act of refashioning the physical body by manufactured means has taken a 
remarkable turn in contemporary medicine. The invention of computer simulations 
used for practicing surgical maneuvers in a video game-like format has an ancestry 
in the artificial limbs of history and is reflected, grotesquely, in Poe's fictional 
version. The body is now created electronically in surgical simulations in order 
to allow physicians and surgeons a "body" on which to practice procedures. I 
find this latest version of the body, when read in the context of the history of 
anatomization and prosthetics, intriguing in that it both advances ideas of what 
constitutes a human body and simultaneously challenges their veracity. If the 
nineteenth century worked to ensure that the incomplete body did, indeed, retain 
a sense of self by creating a prosthesis to mimic corporeal wholeness, then our 
present-day technology seems intent on doing precisely the opposite, deliberately 
fragmenting the body and challenging our understanding of the body and the 
prosthetic. Yet what unites these two seemingly diverse movements is the same 
as what implicitly unites God's finger to Adam's: the human observer or medical 
practitioner who supplies the missing link, becomes the prosthetic, and ultimately 
makes the connection real. 
BELIEVING IN THE FICTION OF A.B.C. SMITH 
1teach American literature and thus have come to believe not only in the power 
of words but also in the importance of stories-both those considered to be true and 
some that, happily, are not. More specifically, I approach stories with the firm belief 
that they express the culture and social attitudes of the historical moment in which 
they were written. That is, I read literature in the context of its cultural history, not 
forging artificial connections between literature and history but believing that there 
are real connections to be found and that these historical links shape and animate 
the literary narrative. Specifically, I have long been intrigued by the connections 
between science and medicine and literature, an interest that manifests itself not 
only in my teaching of courses such as "Anatomy and American Literature" and 
"Literature and Medicine" but also in my scholarship examining anatomical loss 
in American literature of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Given my focus 
on the intersections of seemingly disparate fields, it is no surprise that rwas drawn 
to what I saw at the Virtual Reality Lab of Penn State's College of Medicine during 
a 2002 NEH Summer Institute on "Literature, Medicine, and Culture." This lab, 
inhabited by artificial anatomies as well as human bodies, exhibits the increasingly 
complicated role the prosthetic plays in the connection, completion and creation 
of the human. . 
This modern complex of issues, however, can be found much earlier in Edgar 
Allan Poe's account of Brevet Brigadier General A.B.C. Smith in "The Man That 
Was Used Up," published in 1850. This story suggests that even if one is almost en­
tirely composed of artificial parts, humanity somehow reasserts and even improves 
itself; the reconstituted man becomes greater than the sum of his parts rather than 
simply a collection of them. Poe's story surpasses even the rhetoric of artificial 
limbs during this same historical era, which raved about the accomplishments of 
such products, guaranteeing "Mechanism in Perfection" as well as the ability to 
"Reproduce Nature in Art."2 
As a means of proving these claims, artificial limb manufacturers would pub­
lish pages and pages of testimonial letters, all raving about the superior advantages 
of their products. Prosthetic manufacturer A. A. Marks, for example, in his 1910 
Manual of Artificial Limbs, includes letters from satisfied customers. Thus Mon'is 
Force, of Somerville, New Jersey, reports in a letter dated 1887 that after losing 
his right arm and leg in a railroad accidenr, he obtained a series of artificial legs 
and rubber feet from the A. A. Marks Company. He gives "high praise" to the 
rubber foot, especially, for the durability which will "commend it to all laboring 
people." Force writes: "I weigh two hundred and fifty pounds and am on my feet 
most of the time. During the [sic] seventeen years the repairs on my artificial leg 
have not exceeded $10." Another letter-writer, identified only by his initials as 
F.A.S, describes wearing Marks's artificial legs for twenty-six years. Although he 
works at a bench ten hours a day and often must climb ladders, he finds that "with 
the rubber feet I am able to do as much as anyone." In his leisure time, he walks a 
great deal and even plays billiards. "Sundays when at home I can be found lying 
on a lounge, with my legs crossed in an easy and comfortable position, reading 
some agreeable noveL" In short, he finds no hindrance in whatever he wishes to 
do and feels as well off with Marks's substitutes as with those that nature gave 
him-indeed, he writes, "it is so long since I had my naturals that I have entirely 
forgotten them.") 
By 1918, A. A. Marks's Manual ofArtificial Limbs devoted an entire chapter 
to the question of the utility of prostheses. Although the Manual baldly claimed 
that "an artificial arm possesses functions comparable to those of the natural," it 
added more modestly that "a reasonable and a compensating amount of utility is 
assured." But artificial limbs served purposes other than utility: "The wholesome 
2Douglas 81y, Descriplioll oj (J New, Curialis, alld ImpOrloJII Illvelliioll (Rochester. New York, 
1860),3. 
3A. A. Marks, Mallllol oj Artificial Limbs (New York, 1910),223. 
effect an arm has on the stump, that of keeping it in a healthy and vigorous 
condition, protecting it from injuries, forcing it into healthful activity, together 
with its ornamental aspect, are," the Manual claims, "sufficient reasons for wearing 
one.,,4 The chapter is replete with engraved drawings of workers, such as the 
secretary who is able to hold and guide a pen with her rubber hand while her 
"natural hand" keeps the paper from sliding off the desk. Another drawing depicts 
a young woman cooking, her dress pulled away so that her artificial leg is exposed. 
The truthfulness of these advertisements and testimonials is obviously sus­
pect; was F.A.S., for example, so satisfied with his al1ificial legs that, as he says, 
he has "entirely forgotten" his "naturals?" More interesting are the subtler "truths" 
about conceptions of human selfhood and wholeness implied in these catalogs. 
Striking in all these testimonials is the utter conviction that physical wholeness, 
even if artificial, outweighs the pain and discomfort of prosthetics. What seems 
missing in these accounts is the "ornamental aspect" of prosthetics, the fact that 
they can restore an appearance of symmetry and wholeness. The writers of these 
testimonials value their artificial limb not for how it makes them look but what it 
enables them to do. The emphasis is on practical and economic utility; wearers of 
prosthetic limbs can once more continue to work, improving not only their financial 
status but also their roles as contributing members of society. In this perspective, 
prosthetic limbs become a more integral part of the human person than might first 
be supposed; the natural and the artificial-flesh and metal, bone and wood-are 
alike members of a functioning human body. 
But just what is the relation at this historical moment between nature and 
artifice? The testimonial letters claim that the artificial limbs are as good as new. 
But a "new" what? A new artificial leg? Or a new leg made of flesh, blood and bone? 
Similarly, the prosthetics seem to "[fulfill) allthe requirements of the natural." But 
what are the requirements of a natural leg? That its wearer can work? Can look 
whole? Can feel? That the new leg contributes to a psychological sense, for the 
amputee, of being an unmutilated, whole body again? Is the human being who is 
thus preserved the same as before? What ultimately makes a person human-the 
outward appearance of being human? The ability to perform human functions? 
The presence of all anatomical pm1s in their proper places? It seems that what 
these testimonials finally, though implicitly, admit is that the physical body is no 
longer central to human integrity and that its boundaries and dimensions are no 
longer stable or well-defined. 
Edgar Allan Poe's 'The Man That Was Used Up" provides a fictional com­
mentary on these very questions-both implicit and explicit-raised by a body that 
is partially prosthetic. The story of General A.B.C. Smith is told by one of Poe's 
often agitated narrators-"constitutionally nervous," as he describes himself. The 
nalTator is frustrated because although he has heard that Smith is a "remarkable" 
4Ibid., 226. 
fellow with a highly-decorated military record, he does not find out until he lit­
erally trips over what little of Smith remains that Smith is remarkable precisely 
because there is very little of him left; he is, as the title indicates, "used up."5 
The Brevet Brigadier General's physical characteristics are particularly strik­
ing. About six feet in height, Smith possesses an "air distingue" which suggests 
fine breeding and hints at high birth (378). His flowing, jet black hair would do 
"honor to a Brutus," and his whiskers are the "handsomest pair ... under the sun." 
These superlatives continue as the narrator notes "the most brilliantly white of all 
conceivable teeth," a voice surpassing in "clearness, melody, and strength," and 
eyes that are "worth a couple of the ordinary ocular organs." The narrator con­
tinues a methodical review of Smith, from the top of his head down through a 
pair of shoulders which would call up "a blush of conscious inferiority into the 
countenance of the marble Apollo" and "superb" limbs that move with "rectangu­
lar precision," creating a "dignity of colossal proportion" (379, 380). In short, all 
these anatomical parts have been joined together to form a person who is, as one 
friend says of the General's limbs, "ne plus ultra" (379). 
Throughout most of the story, the narrator unsuccessfully seeks information 
about Smith from the General's friends and acquaintances. In these episodes, the 
word "man" recurs-a deliberate repetition that is not just humorous. We are meant 
to contemplate the possibility that a "man" as impressive as Smith could be created 
by such advanced mechanics. Smith himself displays his faith in what he calls the 
power of human mechanical ingenuity. "There is nothing at all like it," he boasts, 
"we are a wonderful people, and live in a wonderful age .... There is really no end 
to the march of invention" (381). Concurrently, we are supposed to wonder if, in 
fact, Smith can be a man at all, since so much of him is made of artificial parts 6 
The narrator finally abandons hope of leaming about Smith from his friends 
and goes at last to the source, General A.B.C. Smith himself. He enters Smith's 
dressing chamber but does not immediately see him. What he does spy is "an 
exceedingly odd-looking bundle of something" lying close by his feet, and he 
admits that, being ill-humored, he "gave it a kick out of the way" (386). The 
bundle, as it turns out, is Smith, and he is surprised by the narrator's action. "'God 
bless me! My dear fellow ... what-what-what-why, what is the matter? J really 
believe you don't know me at all.''' In "inexplicable evolution" (387), the narrator 
notes, with an entendre that suggests the Darwinian rhetoric of natural selection, 
Smith carefully puts himself together: first the cork leg, then the arm, shoulders 
and chest, up to the wig, which is necessary because he has been scalped. Then 
come the teeth and eyes and finally the palate, which transforms Smith's voice 
from a squeak and a whistle to the deep and rich voice he commands in public. All 
5Edgar Allan Poe, "The Man That Was Used Up," in The Complete Sruries (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1992), 387. 
6These episodes arc a kind of rhetorical prosthetic meant to supply the missing piece of conviction that 
Smith is truly a man at precisely Ihe momenl when Smilh's human integrity is about 10 be challenged. 
the while, Smith reels off the names of the manufacturers who have supplied him 
with these various anatomical parts, which, according to historical sources, were 
real people and actual businesses (387). After witnessing this transformation, the 
narrator at once takes his leave, now comprehending that General A.B.C. Smith is 
"the mall that was used up" (389). 
The story and its characters extol the advances and wonders of the mechanical 
world. Yet the clearly humorous tone complicates any exact judgment. The reader 
is supposed to laugh at the apparent absurdity of General Smith who could never 
have survived such mutilation. Smith is comical because of the absurd extremes 
he represents, but this comic effect also depends on our knowing that such an 
absurdity could never actually happen and that human integrity is therefore safe 
and unthreatened. Even so, however, the humor in the text seems as nervous as the 
narrator. Not only is modern industrial society capable of manufacturing machines 
to look like individual parts of the body but, if multiple pieces of the human 
anatomy are missing, can also replace them. These artificial replacement parts 
allow the person to appear and function as before-much as the catalog of A. A. 
Marks suggests-and even more startling, enhance the whole person: Smith is now 
"remarkable." The perfect human body, Poe's story suggests, may not be a divine 
but a mechanical creation, not the handiwork of Michelangelo's creator, God, but 
of A. A. Marks. In fact, the perfect human may not be human at all. 
THE PROSTHETIC OF BELIEF IN SIMULATED MEDICINE 
Poe's comic fantasy at first seems markedly dissimilar from today's medical 
accounts of virtual reality simulations that mimic patient reactions. Yet the com­
puter simulations of body parts that are used to practice surgical maneuvers or 
the full-size patient who is the electronically-sophisticated successor to the rubber 
c.P.R. dummy are direct descendants of the remarkable General Smith and of all 
the satisfied owners of A. A. Marks's prosthetics. Poe's text, written long before 
the introduction of such technology, is remarkably prescient, and its fictional status 
suggests the fiction embedded in simulated medicine, where characters are created 
to tell a story of illness and health and where reader-practitioners are responsible 
for bringing such virtual patient-characters to life. But unlike Poe's General Smith, 
whose humanity is realized only when he is put together in a complete and sym­
metrical whole, bodies in the scenarios of contemporary medicine are considered 
human despite being only simulated body fragments or having no human element 
at all in their electronic machinery. 
What ultimately Jinks General A.D.C. Smith with his contemporary progeny, 
however, is a metaphorical prosthetics. The trajectory from Poe's nineteenth­
century vision to medicine today is clear. The fragmented body of Poe's Gen­
eral Smith needed artificial anatomical parts to complete his humanness. Smith is 
the partial prosthetic; there is something of flesh, blood and bone left-although 
very little. With today's technology, the prosthetic has taken over entirely; nothing 
organic remains. Yet there is one further metaphorical prosthetic that is vital for un­
derstanding both General Smith and the bodies of virtual medicine as human. Just 
as the observer's gaze completes the life-giving connection between the fingers of 
God and man in Michelangelo's painting, so both A.B.C. Smith and his modern 
medical counterparts require observers-the General's friends and acquaintances, 
the practitioners of virtual medicine-to supply the prosthetic of belief necessary 
for their humanness to be fully realized. 
Before this can be supplied, however, the daunting task of creating the "pa­
tient" has to be completed. Helene Hoffman and Dzung Vu explain that "The 
objective is to create high-fidelity 'virtual humans' that provide realistic organ 
deformation and bleeding of tissues, allow realistic surgical interactivity, and give 
tactile feedback."7 This challenge has been met by the early generation computer 
simulation programs now in use by physicians, surgeons, nurses and even students. 
Endoscopy, colonoscopy and arthroscopy are only a few of the medical procedures 
now possible in this virtual world. An entire "patient" is now constructed out of 
rubber and wires and electrical impulses; Scott Oukatman refers to this as "hard­
wired subjectivity."s Medical schools and hospitals are developing laboratories 
for these virtual bodies, which are housed in computer software, latex parts or 
whole body mannequins. As an anesthetist at a Oritish university describes such 
labs, these rooms resemble "a cross between Madame Tussaud's and the Hunterian 
Museum at the Royal College of Surgeons.,,9 
This is how haptics works for procedures that require threading a scope 
through a specific part of the body. First, a dummy scope is passed into a box with 
a small hole in the top, which simulates an orifice of the body. The practitioner 
experiences a simulation that feels like passing the instrument down the throat, 
through the colon or into the knee joint and, at the same time, watches a computer 
monitor which shows the scope threading through the virtual body part. In this 
virtual world, then, the practitioner can both see and feel the scope "in" the body. 
The claims of realism and accuracy in contemporary promotional literature 
for such virtual programs bear an uncanny resemblance to the ad vertising for 
prosthetics by nineteenth-century manufacturers like A. A. Marks. Digital patients, 
according to the promotional literature of the company that developed one such 
program, "respond in a physiologically accurate manner adding to the level of 
realism," including "audible responses" of "discomfort or pain."ID In the case 
7Helene Hoffman and Dzung Vu. "Virtual reality: Teaching Tool of the Twenty-first Cenlury?," Aca­
demic Medicille 72, no. 12 (December 1997): 1078. 
8SCOll Dukatman, Termillalidelllil)': The Virtllol SlIbjecl ill Poslmodern Sciellce (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 1993),244. 
9Andrew Mcindoe, "The Future F~ce of Medi~a1 Training: Ship-Shape and llri'lol F8shionT Brilish 
Journal of Thealre Nursillg 8, no, 8 (Nov. 1998): 6. 
IO"Endoscopy" ImmersiOIl Medical, 20m, hllp://lVwwillllllersiOI/.com/prnducls/medical/endoscopy 
(accessed 6 September 2003). 
of virtual colonoscopy, for example, the images are "derived from actual patient 
data" and react "like real tissue in real time-the colon expands with air insufflation 
and collapses with suction." In a different module, users can identify and remove 
"simulated polyps" with complications such as uncontrolled bleeding when "the 
polyp head is guillotined."" In order to practice laparoscopic techniques, one 
computer program's visuals are based on "actual intra-abdominal images," and 
the simulated tissue reacts to the user's manipulations, rupturing and bleeding 
if mishandled. In arthroscopy of the knee, the simulator relies on a portion of an 
artificial leg, from the mid-thigh area through the knee and down to the foot, which 
the surgeon can use to adjust the bend of the knee to expose spaces between the 
bones and position the arthroscope to examine the structures of the knee. Clumsy 
manipulation of the simulator produces appropriate audio feedback, while clumsy 
manipulation of the scope too often does not lead to serious damage or death of 
the patient but, in the virtual reality world, to a flashing sign of "Game Over" on 
the screen. 
On a larger scale, there are life-size, computer-driven mannequins that talk, 
breathe, move and mimic physiological changes so that health care workers can 
practice their skills and-especially in the case of students-experience new sit­
uations without the risk of harming a real person. One company has developed a 
virtual patient named "Simantha™ ," 12 while another company has created "Stan" 
(short for "standard patient"). Simantha™ is advertised as a mannequin with gen­
uine patient reactions. "She follows instructions, such as coughing or breathing 
in a bag," according to the company profile, "and has the ability to respond to 
questions or express discomfort during the procedure." The program's molto is 
"See one, sim one, solve many.,,13 
I met "Stan" in the Simulation Development and Cognitive Science Labora­
tory of Penn State's College of Medicine where this mannequin is used by physi­
cians, nurses and medical students to practice techniques, enhance teamwork and 
develop skills necessary in time-sensitive patient care. For example, Stan can be 
programmed to exhibit appropriate physiological responses to various treatments. 
Too much anesthesia and Stan's vital signs react, requiring immediate decisions 
in order to stabilize the "patient." Or Stan can be programmed to have an asthma 
attack so that practitioners can observe the resulting physiological changes. Small 
holes in Stan's arms, legs and torso can be used to insert leads for intravenous fluids, 
and a curtain surrounding the operating table has even been painted to resemble 
the interior of an operating room to make the virtual experience as realistic as pos­
sible. Both Stan and Simantha™ have a "human" voice that communicates how 
1I"Lower G. I." ImmersiOI/ Medical, 2003 hlfp://wlVw.il1llller,iol/.com/producls/llledical/el/doscopy/ 
lower..gi.php (accessed 6 September 2003). 
12Simanlha™ is manufacturcd by the Medical Simulation Corporalion (MSC) and is part of the 
SirnSuite™ training Syslcm. 
1)"Case Study" Sa[eNef Consulting, 2003 "rtp://wwlv.sa[ellefconsultillg.com/uploads/adl/lin/lnjiNef_ 
MedicalSimspd[(accesscd 6 Septcmber 2003). 
each is feeling and establishes the "emotional connection" which, according to the 
director of Harvard's medical simulation program, "really seems to draw students 
in" and helps them "begin to acquire the critical skills of effectively interviewing 
a patient."14 
The advantages of these simulated human bodies are enormous not only for the 
economics and ethics of medical practice but especially for education, since it still 
follows the century-old apprenticeship model exemplified by the phrase "see one, 
do one, teach one."IS A shortage of patients needing a colonoscopy, for instance, 
would not allow aspiring medical residents or young surgeons to practice the skill. 
Yet without such practice, there is the possibility of more mistakes, morediscomfort 
for future patients, more time in the operating room where cost is measured by the 
clock and-in worst case scenarios-<langerous, perhaps lethal failures in surgical 
training. At the same time, the controversy surrounding the use of animals for 
training and experimentation can now be avoided. As one company observes in a 
guide to their products: "Hands-on practice in the OR is ... effective.... But there 
is one problem: with a live patient on the table, learning by trial and error is simply 
not an option. But now, there is a safe and effective alternative ... that replaces the 
vulnerable patient with expendable pixe]s."16 
Despite the increase in patient simulators like Stan and Simantha, however, 
some educators and critics worry that their use limits practitioners' time with actual 
patients, while others are still waiting to be convinced that practice on a virtual 
patient really improves actual performance. In the last few years, studies have 
yielded mixed conclusions about the usefulness of virtual medicine. Arthroscopy 
simulators seem to help surgeons develop skills and discriminate among fine motor 
movements. 17 A three-week course with a virtual endoscopy simulator signifi­
cantly improved the skills of beginners more than practice in a clinical selling 
since the number of opportunities to practice technique was fewer. 18 Yet pro­
grams for simulated training in other fields, such as in minimally invasive surgery 
or obstetrics and gynecology, are not as well developed,19 and it is still unclear 
if current technology is more effective than traditional methods of training. 1n a 
recently published study, researchers conclude that if it is the only form of training, 
14 M. J. Friedrich, "Praclice Makes f'erfecl: Risk-foree Medical training wilh Palienl Simulators" JOllmal 
of Alllerican Medical Associarioll 288. no. 22 (December 11,2002): 2811. 
IS"Simulation.based training, available to medical professionals at Geisinger Health System," 20m, 
Virtual Medical World MOIl/hly h..p://www.hoise.com/vmw/02/articles/vmw/LV. VM-J 2·02-28.hlml 
(accessed 6 Seplember 2003). 
16"Laparoscopy" Immersion Medical, 2003 IJllp://immersion.co/ll//IIedicalJprodllc!s/laparoscopy (ac­
cessed 6 Seplember 2003). 
17R. A. Pedowitz, J. Esch, and S. Snyder, "Evalualion of a virtual realily for arthroscopy skills devel· 
opment," ArthrOKOpy 18.6 (July-Augusl 2002): E29. 
18 A. Ferlitsch el aI., "Evalualion of a vinual endoscopy simulator for training in gastrointeslinal en­
doscopy," Endoscopy 34, no. 9 (SeplCmber 2002): 727-729. 
19 A. Park aod D. 13. Wilschke. "Training and Educational Approaches 10 Minimally Invasive Surgery: 
Siale of Ihe Art." Seminars ill Laparoscopic SlIrgery 9. no. 4 (December 2002): 198-205. 
state-of-the-art virtual reality-based endoscopy simulation is actually inferior to 
traditional bedside teaching techniques. 2o What these last studies seem to suggest 
is that training in a virtual environment is no substitute for training in the real 
world. 
There are, however, other criticisms, concerns and complicated theoretical 
questions that SimanthaTM, Stan and the cohort of virtual body parts raise. "Stan" 
has been constructed without breasts, and his name identifies him as male. Yet 
increasing numbers of studies indicate the importance of conducting trials for 
medication or treatments on both men and womell, since the biological sexes dif­
fer physiologically, manifest ailments differently and have different physical and 
psychological responses to treatment. I cannot help but wonder whether Stan has 
been programmed to respond as a man (and, likewise, whether Simantha™ has 
been programmed to respond as a woman)-a significant question given the par­
ticular patterns that researchers find in men's and women's speech, conversational 
styles and emotional responses. 
There are other concerns as well. L. 1. Whalley concedes that initially, "Virtual 
reality machines will offer doctors the opportunity to use super computers without 
sacrificing their own primary commitment to the provision of medical care of their 
patients.,,21 Yet Whalley also worries that the virtual environment will be "deter­
mined by the machines' programmes and not by the laws of nature. When such 
simulations are high Iy complex (as they are certain to be) the chances of error must 
increase," and it is "also likely that the naive user of virtual reality environments 
will fail to detect errors or distortions.,,22 Errors in a computer program are petty 
annoyances that we learn to live with in our technology-dependent world while 
hoping that such errors do not occur at a particularly inopportune time. Yet what 
is the opportune time for error in a program that simulates a patient's response 
to anesthesia? And what if the practitioner is unable to detect that an error has 
occurred-only to reproduce the error on the first real patient who presents with 
such a complication? 
Whalley further contends that problems may arise when a living patient is 
introduced into a virtual reality environment. Such an environment may enable a 
disabled or chronically ill patient to engage in activities prevented by their disability 
or to engage in rehabilitation after traumatic injury. However, Whalley sees a 
danger to patients who interact in a virtual environment with fictional characters 
who have no autonomy or free will, who must behave as they are programmed and 
who may 1I0t respond to the patient as other living persons would in real life. 
Similar issues arise ror students and physicians whose education and practice 
takes place at least partly in a virtual reality world populated by the likes of 
20G. S. Lelterie, "Medical education as a science: the quality of evidence for computer-assisted in­
struction," American loumal of Obslelrics & Gynecology J88, no. 3 (March 2003): 849-853. 
2\ L. J. Whalley, "Ethical Issues in the Application of Vinual Reality to Medicine," COll1pulers ill 
lliology and Medicine 25, no. 2 (1995): 108. 
22Ibid., 109. 
Simantha™ and Stan. Simulated persons and body parts have no agency; they 
are programmed to display certain symptoms, react according to the decisions of 
the human manipulating the controls and then continue to react according to their 
pre-programming. What Stan cannot do is act outside the program that has been 
written for him; he cannot be unpredictable. What the students and physicians, 
then, cannot experience is a patient who thinks, acts and feels like a human being. 
This is, of course, an argument for why simulated patients cannot entirely take 
the place of real ones; real patients can refuse treatment from one day to the next, 
display physiological symptoms that are affected by their emotional state, believe 
in the power of prayer or positive thinking and respond using different language 
and signs even when asked the same question. 
Thus, interaction with simulated patients cannot help health care practitioners 
develop or practice the interpersonal skills so valued in contemporary medicine 
because these patients are not real, lack agency and, therefore, cannot respond 
spontaneously or capriciously. Educators must ask how effective it is to train 
health care workers to care for virtual patients when their "real" patients will be­
well, real. Interaction with S imantha™ or Stan, J would argue, only prepares for 
interaction with another virtual patient. Furthermore, the virtual environment Stan 
and Simantha™ inhabit omits many factors that affect real life treatment deci­
sions. There is no family to consult, no financial limitations or insurance coverage 
to consider, no threat of a malpractice lawsuit. Besides these objective factors, 
there are the personal emotional responses that doctors and nurses-themselves 
very human-may have to cel1ain illnesses or patient personalities. These more 
subjective factors are intimately connected with human patient care, and they may 
profoundly affect the decisions medical practitioners make, whether consciously 
or unconsciously-is it possible in the fullest sense to "care" for Stan? 
The most profound difference between virtual and human patients is that 
Stan and Simantha™ cannot die. Suppose that Stan is programmed to simulate 
an asthma attack. Practitioners gather around him to diagnose his illness, note his 
breathing and pulse rate, and consider the severity of his symptoms. They decide 
on one of a range of treatment options, and Stan reacts to it, prompting them to 
reassess his condition and make a further decision. But what if at some point their 
decision is wrong? In real life, such a mistake means suffering, deterioration or 
death for the patient. But in the world of virtual reality where Stan is only a teaching 
tool, mistakes not only will occur but are also expected and perhaps even desired as 
a useful "teaching moment"; the health care practitioners either avert the crisis and 
stabilize the patient, or they fail to do so, and in either case the simulation ends. A 
Rick of the switch can reboot the patient, and the simulation begins again. Just so, 
General A.B.C. Smith removes his artificial parts every night and becomes an "odd­
looking bundle of something" on the floor, while every morning he puts himself 
together again, ready to begin another day as a "remarkable man." Nevertheless, he 
remains, however marginally, a man. Somewhere in this odd construct of artificial 
body parts, there persists something-a spark that is human and alive. 
But, of course, life is precisely what is missing in Stan and SimanthaTM. Is 
it possible that knowing that the virtual patient cannot die would lead to different 
treatment decisions in practice simulations? Might dealing with patients who can 
be mechanically reanimated and used over and over again gradually make the prac­
titioner callous or indifferent to disease symptoms, [Jatient reactions or death itself? 
If these attitudes persist when practitioners move from virtual to human patients, 
wi II they not produce caregi vcrs who are interpersonally inept, indi fferent towards a 
patient's emotional responses and fear of dying, and motivated more by selfish con­
siderations of reputation or profit than by an ethical concern for human su ffering? 
Beyond these practical and moral issues are questions that are more philo­
sophic, even metaphysical. Stan lacks agency; he cannot react in a way that has not 
been anticipated and programmed by his developers. The health care practitioners, 
in contrast, seem autonomous and free; they can respond to Stan's symptoms in a 
variety of ways, ranging from doing nothing at all or simply seeking to make Stan 
more comfortable to more aggressive treatments such as administering drugs. Stan 
reacts to their decision, and they react to his reaction. With cach decision, there 
seems to be a loss of autonomy or agency. Like Stan, the human caregivers are 
caught in a flow chart of treatment options, prompted by a program and mediated 
by the virtual patient. 
In today's virtual reality simulations, I suggest, the real and the virtual mingle 
so that the real becomes the virtual and the virtual becomes the real. At what point, 
for example, do the hands of the real surgeon engaged in a virtual endoscopy 
become virtual themselves as they enter into a virtual surgical scenario? At what 
point do the simulated organs of a virtual body become real-not organs of flesh 
and blood but yet sufficiently real that practice on one qualifies one to practice on 
the other? 
Even more intriguing is how both Smith and these virtual reality patients, 
either in part or in whole, seduce the health care practitioners around them into a 
particular belief about human integrity and seJfhood. These computer simulations 
seem to require the willing suspension of belief in the distinction between real and 
unreal, human and not human. The novice student and the experienced surgeon 
both know that they are entering an artificial environment where their patient is 
made of latex or pixels. Yet simultaneously they need to believe that performing a 
surgical procedure on such a body is just as if they were performing it on an actual 
human body. 
Jean Baudrillard, French sociologist and philosopher, offers an analogy to this 
paradox, drawing on a Jorge Luis Borges fable in which "the cartographers of the 
Empire draw up a map so detailed that it ends up covering the territory exactly." The 
map is both identical with the actual terrain and its copy. Today, Baudrillard argues, 
"Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being, or a substance. It 
is the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal." The 
virtual "hyperreal" exactly matches the real: the picture that a practitioner views on 
a computer screen is the pixellated version of what the interior of a colon or knee 
joint actually looks like, whether seen directly or in photographs. Yet Baudrillard 
draws a distinction that helps identify the way this exact simulation challenges 
distinctions between true and false. To "dissimulate," he defines, is "to pretend not 
to have what one has," whereas "to simulate is to have what one doesn't have." 
Thus, "whoever fakes an illness," Baudrillard explains, "can simply stay in bed 
and make everyone believe he is ill." But whoever simulates an illness actually 
"produces in himself some of the symptoms." 23 
Baudrillard's careful discrimination helps clarify the difference between the 
practical and metaphoric use of a prosthetic. An artificial leg or arm replaces the 
real, and although it is not real in the sense of flesh and blood, it does come to 
take the place of the real. Poe's General A.B.C. Smith is made up of artificial body 
parts that do the work of limbs he lost in battle. But to the degree that his friends 
(or he himself) believe that he is a whole man, he becomes a simulation, claiming, 
in Baudrillard's phrase, to "have what [he] doesn't have." The simulated virtual 
body parts and the whole body mannequins used in medicine today provide an 
even closer relationship to I3audrillard's contention about simulation's ability to 
produce the real. They are composed, as is the case in programs that are designed 
for the practice of abdominal surgery, of images of real abdomens, transformed 
into pixellated images displayed on a screen. Simantha™ and Stan, too, come to 
stand in for the real and to present to the practitioner a patient who displays the 
exact physiological attributes needed; in other words, to give the practitioner what 
she or he does not have, namely a real body on which to practice. 
This alternate reality seems to challenge our belief about what makes one 
human and then to dismiss the whole question by substituting images on a com­
puter screen as the surgeon or student becomes complicit in the illusion. Surgeons 
operating on an abdomen and students hovering over Simantha™ or Stan all enter 
into the same agreement, tacitly, to leave clear distinctions between human and 
not human outside of the simulation room and to participate in the belief that the 
knee is a real knee and the body composed of rubber and wires before them on the 
table is a real patient. 
As a result of this agreement, however, just who or what is real? Who or 
what is the fictional character? Who or what has become the simulation, the 
prosthetic') In this exchange between virtual reality simulator and health care 
practitioner, the role of the prosthetic, originally attributed to artificial anatomy, 
expands to encompass the real flesh and blood practitioner. It is only by mak­
ing this switch that the virtual simulators become valuable tools, that the pixel­
lated versions of humanness become bodies real enough from which to learn 
and that the virtual anatomy is recognized as human. The human practitioners, 
23 Jean lJaudrillard. "Simulcra and Simulation." in Posrmodem American Ficrion: A Nnrronl1l/1hology, 
cds. Paula Geyh el al. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company. 1998).633. 
huddled over the table on which the entirely artificial anatomy is displayed, have 
become the prosthetics necessary for the artificial limbs and virtual patients to be 
human. 
To return to Bukatman's phrase, medicine's use of these virtual patients and 
anatomical parts has created a "new hard-wired subjectivity." Out just what does 
it mean if subjectivity, as Poe's short story suggests, is no longer predicated on 
flesh and blood? Computer programs, monitors and wires are now able to carry 
subject status jf configured in a certain format. When they are arranged just so, 
Simantha™ reacts to anesthesia. Arranged slightly differently, Stan is a "lifeless" 
heap of wires and tubes. One false move, and the game of colonoscopy is over. 
It is as if Dr. Frankenstein's theory has come true: electricity-not the touch of 
God-is the animating force with the lightning bolt of a storm replaced by the 
switch on the keyboard and with the fleshly, corporeal self that bleeds real blood 
replaced with only a simulation so that the prosthetic no longer simply supplies a 
part of human integrity but is, in fact, now entirely human itself. 
